Historian Daniel Hedinger on Donald Trump, fascism and the lessons of misguided

- EN - DE
US President Donald Trump looks at a section of the border wall between Mexico a
US President Donald Trump looks at a section of the border wall between Mexico and the United States in June 2020. Photo: Courtesy Donald J. Trump Presidential Library

Fascism is not a template, but an ideology of action, emphasizes historian Dr. Daniel Hedinger from the University of Leipzig. In the interview, he warns that Donald Trump’s second term in office could pave the way for a fascist system precisely through such radical transgressions. He explains how imperial expansion and mutual radicalization tore apart the world order back in the 1930s and warns that recognizing the annexation of Crimea would be a historical breach of taboo, reminiscent of the fatal errors of appeasement policy. A conversation about the global dynamics of fascism and historical lessons.

Dr. Hedinger, is Donald Trump a fascist?

This question has been around since Trump’s first presidency, but the clarity it demands is problematic. Because it obscures a decisive characteristic of fascism: its rise is always the result of a longer process characterized by spurts of radicalization. The other way round: if we can say with absolute certainty that a politician is a fascist, it is already far too late - the masculine form has been deliberately chosen here, by the way, because history is remarkably poor in female fascist leaders or even female dictators.

Fascism is based on a revolutionary ideology aimed at the rebirth of individual nations and overturning existing social, cultural, economic and political orders. However, the debate about the phenomenon has generally spent too long and too much time on questions of definition, which then led to seemingly unambiguous answers, which in turn prevented any further discussion. The only problem with this is that even in a pseudo-fascist autocracy or a quasi-dictatorship, life is no longer so good, depending on your skin color, gender or beliefs. What we can say with certainty at this point in time, however, is that fascism has been on the rise for several years - worldwide. This in turn has a lot to do with Trump.

In your book "The Axis", you show that fascism was historically a transnational phenomenon that radicalized each other and developed global dynamics. Where do you see parallels but also differences to the recent rise of anti-liberal movements and the dynamics that once united the Axis powers of Germany, Italy and Japan?

The world order of the interwar period fell apart because Japan, Italy and Germany worked together to destroy it. All three countries mutually and cumulatively radicalized each other. However, it is often overlooked that this disintegration started from the imperial peripheries in East Asia and Africa - even before it reached Europe in the second half of the 1930s. In the interwar period, fascist radicalization therefore drew above all on trans-imperial cooperation and competition. As a result, even then fascism was not a purely European phenomenon, but a global one.

One should be careful with direct parallels. But translated into the present, I think this implies two things: firstly, we should pay very close attention to such processes of radicalization, especially when they are associated with border crossings. Talking about the occupation of the Panama Canal or Greenland is one thing, a military invasion is something else.

The latter hasn’t happened yet, and that would be my second thesis: the focus is currently very much on Trump and the fascization of the USA. But that’s probably not our biggest problem, even if that’s how the media is currently portraying it. Because unlike the Axis powers, the USA today is by no stretch of the imagination a "do-nothing nation". In other words, in the event of a fascist revolution, many Americans would have a lot to lose and very little to gain. In Germany, for example, at the beginning of the 1930s and in the context of the Great Depression, this seemed to be quite different for many.

In addition, the USA has a long democratic tradition with corresponding institutions. Further radicalization and fascization should therefore be limited there. Of course, the first one hundred days of Trump’s second presidency speak against this. But we have also seen him hesitate time and again in recent days. Fascism, however, is an ideology of action and it remains to be seen what can be implemented domestically. It is extremely worrying that Trump is encouraging an imperial policy. This is likely to have a highly destabilizing effect in many parts of the world for years to come.

Fascist regimes are not only out to aggressively reshape their own society and culture, but also to expand outwards. Your new book "Munich 1938", which deals with the appeasement policy in the 1930s, will be published in the fall. Even today, there are many people who advocate a "realistic" approach and a pacifist arrangement with expansionist regimes. How do you see this from a historical perspective?

Chamberlain’s big mistake, for which history has never really forgiven him, was precisely that he believed Hitler was acting "realistically" and had limited goals. The Munich Conference was the result of this. And the consequences were monstrous. Because overnight, a border that had existed for hundreds of years vanished into thin air. And after the borders began to move for the first time, peace in Eastern Europe was no longer an option. A few months later, Hitler had the so-called "rest of Czechoslovakia" occupied. This marked the transition from a völkisch to an imperial policy. And from then on, things got really bloody. Before 1938, the victims of the National Socialists were counted in thousands, afterwards in millions.

One problem is that not every would-be dictator is the next Hitler. After 1945, the "lessons of Munich" were used for all kinds of US interventions. But of course not every dictator had similarly far-reaching plans. Appeasement and coexistence is certainly an option. As the latest peace proposal shows, Trump is now apparently banking on Putin allowing himself to be pacified by ceding Ukrainian territories. That in itself is a very risky bet.

But there is much more at stake: recognizing the annexation of Crimea would be an epochal cut in international law. In view of the occupation of Manchuria in 1931, the USA developed the so-called Stimson Doctrine, which states that the appropriation of territories by force is not recognized. This principle found its way into the UN Charter and international law and, to put it simply, is one of the pillars on which the post-war order rested. If the USA is now abandoning this principle, the question inevitably arises for Europe as to how far it is prepared to go to defend it. As our book shows, this roughly corresponds to the dilemma faced by the representatives of Western democracies in the context of appeasement. Seen in this light, we are back in 1938, but the fact that we are now once again acutely confronted with such questions also shows how far the departure from the existing world order has already progressed.

Event information:

Daniel Hedinger will give a keynote speech on Wednesday, May 7, 2025 at 5:30 p.m. at the annual conference of the Leipzig Research Center Global Dynamics on the topic of "Trump and the Global Rise of Fascism". His new book "Munich 38: The World at a Crossroads" (C.H. Beck Verlag), which he co-authored with Christian Groeschel, will be published in October. The book sheds light on the fatal consequences of the appeasement policy in the run-up to the Second World War and draws parallels with today’s geopolitical situation.

About Daniel Hedinger:

PD Dr. Daniel Hedinger is a research associate at the Research Centre Global Dynamics (ReCentGlobe) and teaches at the Institute for East Asian Studies. After working in Paris, Zurich, Berlin, Munich, Rome and Kyoto, he came to Leipzig in 2024. He specializes in modern East Asian and European history. His research focuses on "global fascism", the history of the Second World War and colonial violence in the 20th century from a trans-imperial perspective. Together with Nadin Heé, he heads the "Center for Transimperial History".